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Introduction
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability' charts a
clear course for resolving failure-to-warn claims, adopting a
reasonable care approach. While the Minnesota courts have
subscribed to this theory for years, its application has been
complicated. The Minnesota courts' misguided notion of the
roles of court and jury, and their failure to instruct the jury on
the reasonable care standard, have flawed Minnesota's adjudication of failure-to-warn claims. This article describes the Restate-

t Partner, Bowman and Brooke, Minneapolis, Minnesota; B.A., Moorhead State
University, Minnesota, 1976;J.D., Harvard Law School, 1979.
tt Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; BA, University of
Minnesota, 1986; B.S., Moorhead State University, Minnesota, 1988;J.D., University of
Arizona, 1993. Ms. Moen was an Associate at Bowman and Brooke, Minneapolis,
Minnesota at the time this article was authored.
1.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Tentative Draft No. 2,

1995) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 2].
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ment (Third)'s approach to failure-to-warn claims and assesses its
potential impact on Minnesota law.
II.

Application of Negligence Theory for Failure-to-Warn
Claims

Section 1 of the Restatement (Third) subjects a seller to
liability for harm caused by a product which is "defective
because of inadequate instructions or warnings."2 Section 2(c)
sets forth the standard for determining liability:
[A] product is defective because of inadequate instructions
or warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or
other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain
of distribution, and the omission of the instructions or
warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.'
This statement of the standard incorporates several negligence
"Foreseeable risks," "reasonable instructions or
concepts.
warnings," and "not reasonably safe" all implicate the reasonable
care standard. If there was any doubt, the Restatement (Third)'s
comments clarify the basis for determining failure-to-warn
claims: "Subsections (b) and (c) of § 2 rely on a reasonableness
test traditionally used in determining whether an actor has been
negligent."4 The rule is "stated functionally rather than in
The
terms of the classic common law categorizations."'
Restatement (Third) avoids the complications of labeling this
product liability theory as either negligence or strict liability.
In explicitly separating the categories of defect-manufacturing defect, design defect, and inadequate instructions and warnings-the Restatement (Third) significantly differs
from section 402A of the current Restatement (Second) of Torts,
which only generally refers to products "in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous .... "6 In the Restatement (Second),
instructions and warnings are primarily addressed in comment
j to section 402A. Comment j, like the Restatement (Third),

2.

Id. § I(b).

3.

Id. § 2(c).

4.
5.
6.

Id. § I cmt. a, at 3.
Id § 2 cmL m, at 40.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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requires warnings of dangers that are foreseeable.7 Nevertheless, neither commentj, nor any other reference to instructions
and warnings in the section 402A commentary, develops the
reasonable care aspects of failure-to-warn claims to the extent
that is done in the Restatement (Third).
In stating a reasonable care approach to failure to warn, the
Restatement (Third) is consistent with the standard adopted by the
Minnesota courts. Failure to warn in Minnesota has its roots in
negligence law.8 After adoption of strict liability, however, the
Minnesota Supreme Court struggled for a time in its definition
of failure-to-warn theory.9 Then in the 1980s, Minnesota courts
focused the theoretical bases for product liability and adopted
a reasonable care standard for both design defect and failure-to7. Commentj states:
Where... the product contains an ingredient to which a substantial
number of the population are allergic, and the ingredient is one
whose danger is not generally known, or if known, is one which the

consumer would reasonably not expect to find in the product, the
seller is required to give warning against it, if he has knowledge, or
by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and
foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient
and the danger.
I& § 402A cmt. j.
8. Westerberg v. School Dist. No. 792, 276 Minn. 1, 7, 148 N.W.2d 312, 316
(1967) ("Inasmuch as liability rests on negligence there must exist a duty to warn of
a danger inherent in the use of the chattel, whatever it may be, before there will be
liability."); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 331, 154 N.W.2d 488, 496
(1967) ("At this late date in the development of the law relating to the tort liability of
manufacturers of all types of products for injuries caused by their products, there can
be no doubt that a manufacturer is subject to liability for . . . a failure to use
reasonable care in giving adequate and accurate instructions as to the use of the
product and a warning as to any dangers reasonably foreseeable in its intended use.").
9. In Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1979), afftd, 447 U.S.
921 (1980), for example, the court attempted to formulate a standard for the duty to
warn that would not rely upon references to "negligence" or "reasonable care":
Under Minnesota law, a manufacturer has a duty to warn users of its
products of all dangers associated with those products of which it has
actual or constructive knowledge. Failure to provide such warnings
will render the product unreasonably dangerous and will subject the
manufacturer to liability for damages under strict liability in tort.
Id. at 739 (quoting Karjala v.Johns-Manville Products Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 158 (8th Cir.
1975)); see aLso Frey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 258 N.W.2d 782, 786 (Minn. 1977)
("[W]hen the seller knows or should anticipate that an inexperienced purchaser might
use the item sold in a particular manner, the seller has a duty to warn of any dangers
which might arise from that use if the seller knows or should realize that it is likely to
be dangerous for such use and has no reason to believe that the purchaser will
comprehend the danger."). Despite the court's aim of removing negligence principles
from the failure-to-warn inquiry, the Frey court could not help but mention the impact
of foreseeability on a manufacturer's duty to warn. Id. at 788.
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warn cases."° In Germann v. EL. Smithe Machine Co.," the
Minnesota Supreme Court noted that it had "adopted the
for failure to warn is based upon
position that strict liability
12
principles of negligence."
The Duty to Warn and the Role of the Court and Jury
In theory, Minnesota law conforms to the Restatement
(Third)'s negligence standard for deciding failure-to-warn claims.
In practice, however, Minnesota law does not frame failure-towarn issues in the manner contemplated by the Restatement
(Third). For example, if failure-to-warn claims are to be decided
under negligence principles, then the respective roles of court
and jury should be the same as those in any other negligence
case.' 3 In recent years, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court
has recast those roles in warnings cases, creating confusion and
III.

10. See Hauenstein v. Loctite Corp., 347 N.W.2d 272, 274 (Minn. 1984); Bilotta
v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. 1984); Willmar Poultry Co. v. Carus Chem.
Co., 378 N.W.2d 830, 836 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Continental Ins. Co. v. Loctite Corp.,
352 N.W.2d 460, 462 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Peterson v. Little Giant Glencoe Portable
Elevator, 349 N.W.2d 280, 284 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), arid in part, rev'd in part, 366
N.W.2d 111 (Minn. 1985).
11. 395 N.W.2d 922 (Minn. 1986).
12. Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 926 n. 4 (Minn. 1986).
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs §§ 328B, 328C (1965). According to the
Restatement (Second), in a negligence case, the following issues are reserved for the court
to decide as a matter of law:
(a) whether the evidence as to the facts makes an issue upon which
the jury may reasonably find the existence or non-existence of such
facts;
(b) whether such facts give rise to any legal duty on the part of the
defendant;
(c) the standard of conduct required of the defendant by his legal
duty;
(d) whether the defendant has conformed to that standard, in any
case in which the jury may not reasonably come to a different
conclusion;
(e) the applicability of any rules of law determining whether the
defendant's conduct is a legal cause of harm to the plaintiff; and
(f) whether the harm claimed to be suffered by the plaintiff is legally
compensable.
Id. § 328B. Likewise, the jury must determine the following issues:
(a) the facts,
(b) whether the defendant has conformed to the standard of
conduct required by law,
(c) whether the defendant's conduct is a legal cause of the harm to
the plaintiff, and
(d) the amount of compensation for legally compensable harm.
Id. § 328C.
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depriving litigants of the community judgment provided by
juries. Perhaps the Restatement (Third)'s emphatic reliance on
negligence principles will provide the impetus for restoring the
proper roles ofjudge and jury in Minnesota."4
Compare the relative functions of the court and jury in a
design defect case. Like failure to warn, Minnesota has adopted
a negligence standard for deciding products liability cases based
on defective design. 5 The roles of the court and the jury in
a design defect case, however, do not deviate from their
traditional functions in a conventional negligence action.
One common design defect claim is that a machine's
moving parts should be guarded to protect the machine's users
from contact. Even though injuries from such contact may be
foreseeable, the manufacturer's defense may be that the area
must be open for proper function of the machine. In such a
case, the parties' experts will likely debate the issues of safety
versus function. In nearly all instances, the court will submit the
controversy to the jury and instruct the jury on the reasonable
care standard for deciding design defect cases. 6 The jury will

14. See George W. Soule & Sheryl A. Bjork, Minnesota Products Liability Law: 19861992, MINN. DEF., Summer 1992, at 10 [hereinafter Soule & Bjork, Minnesota Products];
George W. Soule, Returning Negligence Principlesto the Trial of Failure to Warn Claims in
Minnesota, MINN. DEF., Summer 1988, at 2 [hereinafter Soule, ReturningNegligence].
15. Bilotta v. Kelley, 346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984). In Bilotta, the Minnesota
Supreme Court distinguished design defect cases from manufacturing defect cases and
held that in cases of the former type, where the "defect" is a "consciously chosen
design," a "reasonable-care balancing test" is to be applied to determine whether the
manufacturer met its duty to produce a safe product. Id. at 622. The court had earlier
articulated the balancing test in Holm v. Sponco, 324 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1982), as
follows:
[A] manufacturer is obligated to exercise that degree of care in his
plan or design so as to avoid any unreasonable risk of harm to
anyone who is likely to be exposed to the danger when the product
is used in the manner for which the product was intended, as well
as an unintended yet reasonably foreseeable use.
What constitutes "reasonable care" will, of course, vary with the
surrounding circumstances and will involve "a balancing of the
likelihood of harm, and the gravity of harm if it happens, against the
burden of the precaution which would be effective to avoid the
harm."
Id. at 212 (quoting Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 577-78 (N.Y. 1976)).
16. Minnesota's pattern jury instruction on the issue of design defect is as follows:
A manufacturer has a duty to use reasonable care when
designing a product, so as to avoid any unreasonable risk of harm to
(anyone who) (property that) is likely to be exposed to harm when
the product is put to its intended use or to any use that is unintended but is reasonably foreseeable.
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then decide whether the manufacturer acted reasonably and
whether, therefore, the product was reasonably safe as designed.
The same approach was employed for years in Minnesota in
deciding failure-to-warn claims. Generally, whether the manufacturer should have provided a warning, or whether a warning
was adequate, was a jury issue.1 7 In 1986, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court departed from this traditional approach,
holding in Germann v. EL. Smithe Machine Co."8 that the need
for a warning in any given case "is a question of law for the
court - not one for jury resolution." 9 According to the court:
In determining whether the duty exists, the court goes to the
event causing the damage and looks back to the alleged
negligent act. If the connection is too remote to impose
liability as a matter of public policy, the courts then hold
there is no duty, and consequently no liability. On the other
hand, if the consequence is direct and is the type of occurrence that was or should have been reasonably foreseeable,
the courts then hold as a matter of law a duty exists. 0
After finding, upon its own de novo review of the facts, that the
"misuse was foreseeable; [that] it was not remote; and [that] the

What constitutes reasonable care will vary with the surrounding
Reasonable care is the care that a reasonably
circumstances.
prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.
The reasonable care to be exercised by a manufacturer when
designing a product will depend on all the facts and circumstances,
including, among others, the likelihood and seriousness of harm
against the feasibility and burden of any precautions which would be
effective to avoid the harm. You are instructed that the manufacturer is obligated to keep informed of scientific knowledge and
discoveries in its field.
If the manufacturer did not use reasonable care when designing
the product in question, then the product is in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the (user or consumer) (user's or

consumer's property).
MINNESOTA DIST. JUDGES ASS'N COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, MINNESOTAJURY

INSTRUCTION GUIDES (CIVIL) JIG 117 (Michael K. Steenson, rep.) in 4 MINNESOTA
This
PRACTICE 1, at 81 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES].
instruction is based upon the Minnesota Supreme Court's holding in Bilotta v. Kelley
and was approved by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407
N.W.2d 92, 96 (Minn. 1987).
17. See Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 622; Frey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 258 N.W.2d
782, 786 (Minn. 1977); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 333,154 N.W.2d
488, 496-97 (Minn. 1967).
18. 395 N.W.2d 922 (Minn. 1986).
19. Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 924 (Minn. 1986).
20. Id.
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danger of injury ...because of the misuse was likewise foresee-

able,"2 the court held as a matter of law that the manufacturer
"had a legal duty to warn operators of the peril of running the
press without a properly attached and operating safety bar."2
The result of Germann is that the courts have taken over the
decision whether a manufacturer must warn against a specific
danger under the particular circumstances." In other words,
Germann requires the trial judge, rather than jury, to determine
whether the standard of care requires a warning under the
circumstances. In doing so, Gennann and many courts following
facts to determine
Germann have decided other preliminary
24
met.
was
care
of
standard
the
whether
Under classical negligence theory, the existence of a duty
in tort is strictly the province of the court.25 The Germann
21. Id. at 925.
22. Id.
23. See Huber v. Niagra Mach. & Tool Works, 430 N.W.2d 465, 467 (Minn. 1988)
(finding as a matter of law no duty of a foot switch manufacturer to warn against
removing the safety device on the switch upon finding that removal of the device was
unforeseeable to the manufacturer; finding also no duty of the manufacturer to warn
of dangers of failing to provide point-of-operation safety devices upon finding it
unforeseeable to the manufacturer that the employer would fail to follow OSHA
regulations requiring such devices); Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 99
(Minn. 1987) (finding a legal duty to warn of an "illusory park" problem after
determining that the manufacturer had knowledge of the problem and was aware of
a "high accident incidence"); Hart v. FMC Corp., 446 N.W.2d 194, 198 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989) (finding no duty of tripper car manufacturer to warn of dangers of operating the
tripper car in particular environments, such as one in which there are low clearance
overhangs along the tripper car track, upon finding the circumstances leading up to
plaintiffs injury unforeseeable to the manufacturer).
24. It is difficult to discern from the opinions precisely what fact issues the courts
have decided to determine whether a warning is required, but at least one such issue
that the appellate courts have decided de novo is whether the manufacturer could have
foreseen that the product would be used in a dangerous manner. See Huber, 430
N.W.2d at 467 (upholding summary judgment; citing Germann as having set forth the
standard for the court to determine whether a manufacturer has a duty to warn, then
stating, "this standard requires a determination whether it was foreseeable to the
manufacturer that the product would be used in a dangerous manner"). But see
Michael K. Steenson, ProductsLiability Law in Minnesota: DesignDefect andFailureto Warn
Claims, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 443, 486 (1988) ("If there is a serious dispute over
the foreseeability of a particular injury or risk, the fact question could be submitted to
the jury in the form of a special verdict.").
25. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 37, at
236 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328B (1965). As Prosser and

Keeton explain, the existence of a duty depends on
Whether, upon the facts in evidence, such a relation exists between
the parties that the community will impose a legal obligation upon
one for the benefit of the other - or, more simply, whether the

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014

7

William Mitchell
Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 11
WILLIAM MITCHEL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

court, however, as well as later courts following Germann, have
confused the element of "duty" as it applies to negligence
theory.26 "[T]he critical aspect of the true duty issue is the
relationship between plaintiff and defendant. The question for
the court is whether public policy should impose a standard of
conduct to govern the actions of one party in this relationship
toward the other."27 In this regard, the Minnesota courts have
long ago resolved the legal duty of a manufacturer to provide
warnings to the users and consumers of its products. That is, a
manufacturer has a duty to exercise reasonable care in warning
28
users and consumers of foreseeable dangers of its product.
Once a general duty in tort is found to exist, the court must
then determine "the standard of conduct required of the

interest of the plaintiff which has suffered invasion was entitled to
legal protection at the hands of the defendant....
It is no part of
the province of a jury to decide whether a manufacturer of goods is
under any obligation for the safety of the ultimate consumer, or
whether the Long Island Railroad is required to protect Mrs. Palsgraf
from fireworks explosions.
KEETON ET AL., supra, § 37, at 236 (citations omitted).

26. The confusion likely stems from the unfortunate phrase "duty to warn," which
in Germann and later cases has been substituted for the more accurate phrase, "the
requirement of a warning to meet the standard of care." The word "duty" in the
phrase "duty to warn" is misleading, as it refers not to the legal duty of a manufacturer
to exercise reasonable care in providing warnings and instructions, but rather to the
factual duty of the defendant to conform to that standard of care. The Germann court
failed to make that distinction.
27.

Soule, Returning Negligence, supra note 14, at 6.

28. See cases cited supra note 8; see also Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 1
(setting forth the liability, or duty, of a commercial seller for harm caused by defective
products). The duty to warn and instruct under the Restatement (Third) is limited to the
time of sale or distribution of the product. Id. § 1(b). Thus, the Restatement (Third)
does not address the duty of the manufacturer to warn users and purchasers of a
product's dangers discovered by the manufacturer after the sale of the product. See id.
§ 2 cmt. m ("[F] ault-based claims for post-sale failure to recall, redesign or instruct and
warn are beyond the scope of this Section because they do not rest on the existence
of a product defect at time of sale or other distribution."). Minnesota courts have only
recently addressed the duty of a manufacturer to provide post-sale warnings. In
Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1988), a case
involving the explosive separation of a multi-piece rim of a truck tire that caused injury
to the plaintiff, the court found a post-sale duty may arise "in special cases" and held
that the case at issue was such a special case. Id. at 833. Factors on which the court
relied in finding a post-sale duty included the manufacturer's knowledge of the danger,
the latent quality of the danger, the degree of the danger, whether the product
continued to be advertised and serviced after the manufacturer had knowledge of the
danger, and whether the manufacturer had undertaken to warn other purchasers. Id.;
see also Ramstad v. Lear Siegler Diversified Holdings Corp., 836 F. Supp. 1511, 1516-17
(D. Minn. 1993).
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defendant,"29 which Minnesota courts have determined to be
reasonable care in failure-to-warn cases.3"
At that point,
however, the inquiry shifts to the trier of fact. Assuming there
are genuine disputed issues of fact, 31 the court must allow the
jury to determine "whether the defendant has conformed to the
standard of conduct required by the law."32 Thus, under true
negligence principles, in failure-to-warn cases, it would be for
the jury to determine whether reasonable care requires the
manufacturer to provide a warning, and if a warning is provided,
whether it was adequate, under the circumstances of each case.
The role of the jury would be no different than in the guarding
case illustrated above, in which the jury determines whether
reasonable care requires the manufacturer to provide a protective guard over the machine hazard.
There is no conceptual difference between an allegation of
defect for failure to warn and an allegation of defective design
that warrants such a significant departure from traditional roles
of court and jury in Minnesota failure-to-warn cases. Nothing in
the Restatement (Third)'s discussion of warnings supports Minnesota's anomalous division of authority in failure-to-warn cases;
indeed, the Restatement (Third) treats failure to warn and design
defect similarly for purposes of applying negligence principles.
Minnesota courts should do likewise and take the opportunity
that the Restatement (Third) presents to correct the failure-to-warn
analysis in Minnesota.
IV. The Requirements of Reasonable Care
Although the jury is responsible for deciding whether the
defendant met the standard of reasonable care, the judge must
first instruct the jury as to what is the standard of care. The
Restatement (Third) provides a helpful benchmark for evaluating
Minnesota's pattern jury instruction for failure to warn.
Although partially adequate, Minnesota's present failure-to-warn

29.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328B; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note

25, § 37, at 236.
30. See infra part IV.
31. The court traditionally decides whether there are fact issues for the jury and
whether the jury can reasonably conclude either that the defendant did or did not
conform to the standard of care. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328B(a), (d)
(1965); see also supra note 13.
32.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328C (1965).
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instruction fails to incorporate some of the significant elements
of the reasonable care analysis.
A.

Reasonably ForeseeableDangers

One aspect of reasonable care in a warnings case is
identifying those dangers for which reasonable care requires a
warning. Under the Restatement (Third), a manufacturer may be
liable for failure to warn only of "foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product."" Plaintiff bears the burden of proving
that the risk was "known or should have been known to the
relevant manufacturing community." 4 The Restatement (Third)
thus rejects the doctrine of imputed knowledge that had crept
into some strict liability cases.35 In this respect, the Restatement
(Third) conforms to Minnesota law. The Minnesota courts have
consistently held that a manufacturer may be liable for failure
to warn only of known or reasonably foreseeable dangers of its
product.3 6 Although liability can attach even where dangers
are created by abuse or misuse of a product, such abuse or

33.

Tentative Draft No. 2, supranote 1, § 2(c). The comments to this section state:
Subsections (b) and (c) of § 2 impose liability only when the
product is put to uses that it is reasonable to expect a seller or
distributor to foresee. Product sellers and distributors are not
required to foresee and take precautions against every conceivable
mode of use and abuse to which their products might be put.
Id § 2 cmt. I.
34. Id.
35. Id. § 2 Reporters' Note to cmt. I ("Given the criticism that has been leveled
against the imputation of knowledge doctrine and the relatively thin judicial support
for it, we reject it as a doctrinal matter.").
36. See Balder v. Haley, 399 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. 1987) ("There is 'no duty to
warn of an improper use that could not have been foreseen.'") (quoting Frey v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 258 N.W.2d 782, 788 (Minn. 1977)); Germann v. F.L Smithe
Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 924 (Minn. 1986) ("[Tjhe duty to warn rests directly on
the foreseeability of the injury."); Gryc v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 739
(Minn. 1980) ("[A] manufacturer has a duty to warn users of its products of all dangers
associated with those products of which it has actual or constructive knowledge."), affd
447 U.S. 921 (1980); Frey, 258 N.W.2d at 788 ("[T]he manufacturer's duty to warn must
rest on foreseeability, with no duty to warn of an improper use that could not have
been foreseen."); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 332, 154 N.W.2d 488,
496 (1967) (concluding that the evidence supported the jury's finding of liability for
failure to warn of "dangers reasonably foreseeable in the use of the vaporizer"); Hart
v. FMC Corp., 446 N.W.2d 194, 197 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) ("It must be foreseeable,
under this standard, that the product would be used in a dangerous manner before a
duty to warn will be imposed."); Willmar Poultry Co. v. Carus Chem. Co., 378 N.W.2d
830, 837 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) ("In a strict liability 'failure-to-warn' case, a manufacturer is only required to warn of foreseeable risks in its product.").
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misuse must also be reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer.37 The present Minnesota jury instruction for failure to warn
properly incorporates these reasonable foreseeability con38

cepts.

B.

The Standard of Carefor Non-ManufacturingSellers

When speaking of non-manufacturing sellers, however, the
Restatement (Third) seems to create an exception to the principle
described in the previous section regarding reasonably foreseeable dangers.3 9 The Restatement (Third) commentary describes
the liability of non-manufacturing sellers and distributors for
failure to provide adequate warnings and instructions as follows:
[O]nce it is determined that ...

reasonable instructions or

warnings could have been provided at or before the time of
sale by a predecessor in the chain of distribution and would
have reduced plaintiff's harm, it is no defense that a nonmanufacturing seller of such a product exercised due care.
•... Thus, strict liability is imposed on a wholesale or retail seller
who neither knew nor should have known of the relevant risks, nor
was in a position to have taken action to avoid them, so long as a
predecessor in the chain of distribution could have acted
reasonably to avoid the risks."0
In other words, a product hazard need not be reasonably
foreseeable to a nonmanufacturing seller (such as a retailer or
distributor) before liability may be imposed upon that seller, as
long as the hazard was reasonably foreseeable to a predecessor
in the chain of distribution. The Restatement (Third)'s exception
to the requirement of reasonable foreseeability as to nonmanufacturing sellers, however, is not consistent with Minnesota
law, which provides that even nonmanufacturing sellers must

37. Germann, 395 N.W.2d at 924.
38. See JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 16, JIG 119, at 90 (instructing a
finding of liability "if the (manufacturer) (seller) knew or reasonably could have
discovered the danger involved in the use of the product, and if the product is not
accompanied by adequate (warnings) (instructions)").
39. The Restatement (Third)states that "a product is defective because of inadequate
instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could
have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings
by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution.
." Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 2(c) (emphasis added).
40. Id. § 2 cmt. n (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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warn only of reasonably foreseeable dangers." In fact, Minnesota has enacted legislation that limits the liability of nonmanufacturing sellers in product liability cases except where the
seller has knowledge of the product's defective condition.4 2
Where the nonmanufacturing seller is a commercial usedproduct seller, however, the Restatement (Third) is more lenient.
Commercial used-product sellers are governed by section 9 of
the Restatement (Third). This section applies the provisions of
sections 1 and 2 to a used-product seller 43 but then exempts
the seller from liability if the seller clearly and conspicuously
informs the buyer in writing that it disclaims all legal liability for
product defect, or if the circumstances of the sale would lead a
reasonable person to expect to assume the risk of product

41. See WimarPoultry,378 N.W.2d at 830 (stating that a negligence claim against
the distributors in this case required proof that the distributors had knowledge of their
products' conditions and the risks associated with those conditions; upholding directed
verdict in favor of distributors of potassium permanganate and formaldehyde, which
caused chemical fire when mixed together and used for fumigation, finding that, while
the distributors knew the chemicals were used for fumigation, there was no evidence
they knew or appreciated the risks involved in such use or that they knew the warnings
might have been inadequate).
42. Section 544.41 of the Minnesota Statutes requires the dismissal of any seller
other than the manufacturer in a products liability action as long as the defendant
manufacturer is identified, amenable to service, and able to satisfy thejudgment, if any.
MINN. STAT. § 544.41 subd. 1, 2 (1988). If the plaintiff can show, however, that a
nonmanufacturing seller or distributor exercised any control over the design or
manufacture of the product, had actual knowledge of any defect in the product, or
created the defect in the product, the seller may not be dismissed from the action. Id.
at subd. 3. See, e.g., Gorath v. Rockwell Int'l, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 128, 131 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989) (upholding summary judgment in favor of seller of used paper cutter, finding
no evidence that seller had actual knowledge of any defect in the paper cutter); Vergin
v. Gladwin Mach. & Supply Co., No. C6-91-94, 1991 WL 132763, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App.
July 23, 1991) (upholding summary judgment in favor of seller of used, allegedly
defective press brake, finding no evidence the seller had actual knowledge of the
defect). The Restatement (Third) acknowledges that many jurisdictions have enacted
similar legislation that immunizes nonmanufacturing sellers and distributors from
liability. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 1 cmt. e.
43. The application of §§ 1 and 2 to a used-product seller is likely the same as for
any other nonmanufacturing seller, although the Restatement (Third) commentary is not
explicit on this issue. Thus, a used-product seller may also be found liable for failing
to provide adequate warnings of a risk not reasonably foreseeable to the seller provided
that a predecessor in the chain of distribution could reasonably have foreseen the
hazard. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol21/iss2/11

12

In Minnesota,
the New Restatement on Products Lia
19951Soule and Moen: Failure to Warn
PRODUCTS
LIABILITY

defects." In Minnesota, used-product sellers are governed by
the same rules that apply to other nonmanufacturing sellers.4 5
C. Adequacy of the Warning
The Restatement (Third) incorporates another negligence
concept in its requirement of "reasonable instructions or
warnings,"' adopting a "reasonableness test for judging the
adequacy of product instructions and warnings."47 Thus, a
reasonably adequate warning may permit users to "prevent harm
either by appropriate conduct during use or consumption or by
choosing not to use or consume." Again, this reasonableness
test is reflected in Minnesota law,49 and is incorporated in the
failure-to-warn jury instruction.5 °
D. Remote or Obvious and Generally Known Risks
Another aspect of the Restatement (Third)'s failure-to-warn
standard is that a manufacturer may be liable only when the
warning would have "reduced or avoided" risks of harm, and the
"omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product

44. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 9.
45. See Gorath, 441 N.W.2d at 132. But see Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 9
cmt. f ("Legislation immunizing wholesalers and retailers from strict liability for injuries
arising from the sale of new products should not be interpreted to govern used-product
sellers. A seller of used products seeking to immunize itself from liability may do so
by placing itself within the terms of § 9(c).").
46. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 2(c).
47. Id. § 2 cmt. h.
48. Id.
49. See Krutsch v. Walter H. Collin GmBh, 495 N.W.2d 208, 212 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993) (affirming trial court's denial of motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict on jury's finding that the manufacturer breached its duty to warn by failing to
place warning labels on the product even though it provided warnings in its operation
manual; finding the evidence "not so overwhelmingly on one side that reasonable
minds [could not] differ as to the proper outcome.") (citation omitted); see also STEVEN
J. YiRScH, METHODS OF PRACTICE § 6.54, in 5A MINNESOTA PRACTICE 1, at 146 (3d ed.
1986) ("In general, an adequate warning must communicate with a degree of intensity
that would cause a reasonable person to exercise for his own safety the caution
commensurate with the potential danger.") (citation omitted). In Minnesota, the
adequacy of the warning is for the jury to decide. Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co.,
395 N.W.2d 922, 924-25 (Minn. 1986).
50. Minnesota's pattern jury instruction for failure to warn provides:
For a warning to be adequate it must be set out in such a way that
heeding the warning will make the product reasonably safe for use.
[The warning must be in a form which could reasonably be expected
to catch the attention of, and be understood by, the ordinary user.]
JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 16, JIG 119, at 90.
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not reasonably safe." 51 The Restatement (Third) thus does not
require a warning of every foreseeable risk of harm. The
factfinder may conclude that the absence of a warning does not
render the product "not reasonably safe," or that the warning
would not have "reduced or avoided" the harm.
The largest category of risks that fall within this exemption
includes those found to be obvious or generally known. As to
these risks, the Restatement (Third) states:
In general, no duty exists to warn or instruct regarding risks
and risk avoidance measures that should be obvious to, or
generally known by, foreseeable product users.... Warning
of an obvious or generally known risk in most instances will
not provide an effective additional measure of safety. 52
The Restatement (Third) also notes that warnings of obvious or
generally known risks "can diminish the significance of warnings
In sum,
about non-obvious, not-generally known risks.""
reasonable care does not require a manufacturer to warn of
obvious or generally known risks.
This principle has been recognized in Minnesota law for
years.5 4 While sometimes expressed as "no duty to warn of
open and obvious dangers, " or confused with causation
analysis,56 the principle has its foundation in the reasonable
care standard. Unfortunately, this issue is not addressed in
Minnesota's jury instruction for failure to warn. In fact, the
instruction virtually mandates a finding of liability if the product
'

51.

Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 2(c).

52.
53.

Id. § 2 cmt. i.
Id.

54. See Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assocs. Architects, Inc., 354
N.W.2d 816, 821 (Minn. 1984); Westerberg v. School District No. 792, 276 Minn. 1, 8,
148 N.W.2d 312, 316 (1967); Hart v. FMC Corp., 446 N.W.2d 194, 198 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989); Dahlbeck v. DICO Co., Inc., 355 N.W.2d 157, 163 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
55. Westerberg, 276 Minn. at 8, 148 N.W.2d at 316 (quoting R.D. Hirsh, Annotation,
Manufacturer'sor Seller's Duty to Give Warning RegardingProduct as Affecting His Liability
for Product-CausedInjury, 76 A.L.R.2d 9, 28 (1961)); see also Hoag v. Shore-Master, Inc.,
No. C9-94-508 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1994), FIN. COMM., Nov. 4, 1994, at 55
(reversing denial of defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict;
finding the manufacturer, as a matter of law under the Germann analysis, had no duty
to warn of the danger of injury caused by the recoil action of a spring where such
properties of a spring are open and obvious; stating that "[a] manufacturer has no duty
to warn of the open and obvious dangers of a spring").
56. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
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lacks a warning of a foreseeable danger."
By failing to acknowledge that reasonable care may not require a warning of
every foreseeable danger, the jury instruction significantly
departs from the Restatement (Third).
The Minnesota instruction also fails to allow that reasonable
care may not require a manufacturer to give a warning of an
extremely remote, albeit foreseeable, danger. Such a warning
may "have no effect on product users' conduct,. . . obscure the
effect of other warnings or more significant dangers .... [and]
58
add to the proliferation and dilution of warnings generally."
As the Restatement (Third) acknowledges:
Warnings that are too numerous or detailed may be ignored
and thus ineffective. . . . Useful instructions and warnings
call the user's attention to dangers that can be avoided by
careful product use, but potentially useful instructions and
warnings can be debased if attention must also be directed to
trivial or far-fetched risks.59
In other words, warning of an extremely remote danger may not
"reduce or avoid" harm and may not help render the product
"reasonably safe."'
The Restatement (Third) provides the drafters of Minnesota's
Jury Instruction Guides another opportunity to correct the
failure-to-warn instruction. The instruction should conform to
the reasonable care standard of Minnesota law and the Restatement (Third) and should permit a finding of nonliability if
61
reasonable care does not require a warning.

57. JURY INSTRUcTION GUIDES, supra note 16, JIG 119, at 90 ("A product
(manufacturer) (seller) must ([p]rovide adequate warnings of dangers inherent in
improper use of the product, if the use is one that the (manufacturer) (seller) should
reasonably foresee.)").
58.

Soule, ReturningNegligence, supra note 14, at 9.

59. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 2(c) cmt. h; see also KEETON ET AL., supra
note 25, § 96, at 686; Aaron D. Twerski et al., The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products

Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495, 514-15 (1976).
60. See Henkel v. R & S Bottling Co., 323 N.W.2d 185, 188 (Iowa 1982) ("A
supplier of goods ... is not required to provide a warning of danger when the
reasonable probability of injury is remote, slight or inconsequential."). After stating the
rule, the Henkel court applied it to sustain a directed verdict on a claim of failure to
warn against the extremely rare bursting of a carbonated beverage bottle. Id.
61. One of the authors has previously proposed the following jury instruction:
A manufacturer has a duty to use reasonable care in providing an
adequate warning of any danger involved in the use of a product which poses
an unreasonable risk of harm to persons or property when the product is put
to its intended use or to any use that is unintended but is reasonably
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The Standard of Care as to Special Users of Products

Both the Restatement (Third) and Minnesota law address
situations where the product user either has special knowledge
beyond that of the average reasonable person or where the user
is insulated from the manufacturer by an intermediary with such
special knowledge, often termed "sophisticated user" and
The "learned
"learned intermediary" cases, respectively.
intermediary" case is one in which the product reaches the end
user by way of an intermediary who has special knowledge about
the product, such as the case of prescription drugs which reach
the patient from the manufacturer by way of a trained and
licensed physician.62 In Minnesota, where the learned intermediary is a physician and the product is a prescription drug, the
"learned intermediary defense" has been held applicable to
relieve the manufacturer of liability for failure to warn of the
drug's dangers "if the doctor was fully aware of the facts which
were subject of the warning."6' It has been held not to apply,
however, where the product reaches an employee through the

foreseeable.
What constitutes reasonable care will vary with the surrounding
circumstances. Reasonable care is the care that a reasonably prudent person
would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.
In determining whether reasonable care requires the manufacturer to
provide a warning, you may consider all the facts and circumstances,
including, among others, the likelihood and seriousness of harm and the
feasibility, burden and effectiveness of a warning.
A manufacturer may be required to provide a warning only if the
manufacturer knew or through the exercise of reasonable care could have
discovered the danger involved in the use of the product. A manufacturer is
not required to warn of a danger which would ordinarily be known and
appreciated by those who would be expected to use the product.
For a warning to be adequate it must be set out in such a way that
heeding the warning will make the product reasonably safe for use. The
warning must be in a form which could reasonably be expected to catch the
attention of, and be understood by, the ordinary user.
If the manufacturer did not use reasonable care in providing an adequate
warning, then the manufacturer is negligent.
Soule, Returning Negligence, supra note 14, at 11. See Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d
616 (Minn. 1984); Westerberg v. School Dist. No. 792, 276 Minn. 1, 148 N.W.2d 312
(1967); Mix v. MTD Products, Inc., 393 N.W.2d 18 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); McCormick
v. Custom Pools, Inc., 376 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
62. See, e.g., Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332,335,181 N.W.2d 882, 885
(1970).
63. Id. at 335, 181 N.W.2d at 885; see also Lhotka v. Larson, 307 Minn. 121, 238
N.W.2d 870 (Minn. 1976); Borka v. Emergency Physicians Professional Assoc., 379
N.W.2d 682 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
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employer.6 4 In that case, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held
it unreasonable for the manufacturer to rely on the employer to
adequately warn its employees of the product's dangers.6"
The "sophisticated user" theory applies where the user of
the product has special knowledge such that the user would
already be aware of the dangers inherent in the use of the
product.6 6 Thus, the theory may be viewed as an extension of
the "open and obvious risk" cases in which courts have found
either that reasonable care does not require a warning of an
open and obvious risk,67 or that the failure to warn did not
cause the injury where the risk was open and obvious.'a
According to the Restatement (Third), in most cases there
should be no special rules governing the requirement of a
warning in special circumstances such as where a learned
intermediary separates the manufacturer from the end user:
[Section] 2(c) may require that instructions and warnings be
given not only to purchasers, users, and consumers, but also
to others who a reasonable seller should know will be in a
position to reduce or avoid the risk of harm. There is no
general rule as to whether one supplying a product for the
use of others through an intermediary has a duty to warn the

64. Todalen v. United States Chem. Co., 424 N.W.2d 73 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
65. The Todalen court distinguished the employer-employee relationship from the
doctor-patient relationship noting that in the medical context, safeguards exist that are
not present in the industrial workplace. Id. at 79 (quoting Hall v. Ashland Oil Co., 625
F. Supp. 1515 (D. Conn. 1986)).
For example, a doctor's primary interest in
prescribing a particular drug is to promote the health of the patient, while the
employer's primary criteria in selecting a particular product is that product's industrial

utility. Id. In addition, while a drug manufacturer shifts the duty to warn onto a party
who can be held legally liable to the patient for failing to fulfill that duty, an industrial
supplier's duty would be shifted to one having limited liability under the workers'
compensation statutes. Id.
66. See Dahlbeck v. DICO Co., 355 N.W.2d 157, 163 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) ("[A]
manufacturer has no duty to warn when the dangers of a product are within the
professional knowledge of the user.") (quoting Strong v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co.,
667 F.2d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 1981)).
67. See Westerberg v. School Dist. No. 792, 276 Minn. 1, 8, 148 N.W.2d 312, 316
(1967); see also supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
68. See McCormick v. Custom Pools, Inc., 376 N.W.2d 471, 476 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985) (affirming summary judgment on claim of failure to warn of risk of diving in a
shallow pool where plaintiff was found to be a "good and accomplished swimmer" who
"knew he had to execute a surface dive to avoid the serious risks involved in shallow
diving"); see also infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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ultimate product user directly or may rely on the intermedi-

ary to relay warnings."
Similarly, although Minnesota cases discuss special rules for both
the "learned intermediary" and the "sophisticated user" case, the
requirement of a warning to a particular person under Minnesota law or the Restatement (Third) depends upon whether a
reasonable manufacturer would provide a warning to the user
under the same circumstances.70

69. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. h. The Restatement (Third) does,
however, provide a special rule for manufacturers of prescription drugs. The
Restatement (Third) defines defect in a prescription drug for failure to warn as follows:
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe
because of inadequate instructions or warnings when
(1) reasonable instructions or warnings regarding
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or medical
device are not provided to prescribing and other
health care providers who are in a position to reduce
the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions
or warnings; or
(2) reasonable instructions or warnings regarding
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or medical
device are not provided directly to the patient when
the manufacturer knew or had reason to know that no
health care provider would be in a position to reduce
the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions
or warnings.
Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 8. Nevertheless, even § 8 evaluates the conduct
of a prescription drug manufacturer according to the standard of a reasonable
manufacturer responding to reasonably foreseeable risks.
70. Compare, for example, the "emergency doctrine," a common negligence
defense. As described by Prosser and Keeton, this doctrine is often cited by courts for
the proposition that an actor faced with an emergency situation "is not to be held to
the standard of conduct normally applied to one who is in no such situation." KEETON
ET AL., supra note 25, § 33, at 196 (citations omitted). Thus, the doctrine apparently
applies a different standard of care to such a defendant. According to Prosser and
Keeton, however, many courts have hedged on this doctrine to the extent that the
standard of conduct required of one acting in an emergency situation is now more
properly the same as in any other negligence case: "The conduct required is ...that
of a reasonable person under the circumstances, as they would appear to one who was
using proper care, and the emergency is to be considered only as one of the
circumstances." Id. at 196-97 (citations omitted). Similarly, in the case of a special
user, the standard of conduct required of the manufacturer for providing warnings or
instructions should remain as that of a reasonable manufacturer under same or similar
circumstances, and the special knowledge or awareness of a user, or of an intermediary
between the manufacturer and the user, should merely be part of the circumstances
to be considered.
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V. Causation
As in any tort case, a plaintiff alleging failure to warn must
prove that defendant's conduct caused plaintiffs harm. The
Restatement (Third) reflects this element in its first sentence: "One
engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing
products who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to
liability for harm to persons or property caused by the product
defect."" 1
In a failure-to-warn case, plaintiff must prove that "had the
product been accompanied by reasonable instructions or
warnings, the harm to the plaintiff would have been avoided or
diminished."7 2 The Restatement (Third) does not adopt any
special rules for deciding causation, instead deferring to "the
73
prevailing rules and principles governing causation in tort."
Minnesota courts have addressed various causation issues
unique to failure-to-warn cases. One such issue is whether the
obviousness of a product danger is relevant to whether reasonable care requires a warning. Minnesota's failure-to-warn jury
instruction did not deal with the subject, apparently because its
drafters "were divided or uncertain as to whether an open and
obvious danger is relevant to the duty issue or the causation
issue." 74 Open and obvious dangers may, in fact, be relevant
to both issues.
The manufacturer's duty of reasonable care extends to all
reasonably anticipated users of the product, not just to the
individual plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiffs knowledge, while
perhaps relevant, is not determinative of whether reasonable
care requires a warning. Thus, as noted by Prosser, there is
no duty to warn of "a condition that would ordinarily be seen
and the danger of which would ordinarily be appreciated by
those who would be expected to use the product." ...

The causation issue, on the other hand, focuses on the
individual product user, whether it be the plaintiff or another
person using the product when the plaintiff is injured. Thus,

71. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 1(a) (emphasis added).
72. Id. § 10 cmt. a.
73. Id. § 10.
74. Soule, Returning Negligence, supra note 14, at 10; JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES,
supra note 16, JIG 119, Authorities at 93.
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failure to warn is not the cause of an accident or injury when
the product user is actually aware of the danger.7 5

Minnesota courts have dismissed failure-to-warn claims on
causation grounds in several cases in which the product user was
aware of the danger of which the manufacturer should have
warned.76 As stated by one court:
Where the presence of a warning would not have altered the
user's conduct, the failure to warn is not a proximate cause
of the injury.... Also, if despite the lack of warning, a user
is fully aware of the danger of which the manufacturer
should have warned, there is no causal connection between
the lack of warning and the injury.77

Another causation issue is the effect of the product user's
failure to read the allegedly inadequate warning. The Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed this issue in J & WEnterprises, Inc.
v. Economy Sales, Inc.,7' holding that plaintiff must first prove
that he relied on a warning before the issue of its adequacy
reaches the jury.79 There is no causal link between the allegedly inadequate warning
and the harm if the product user has not
80
read the warning.

75. Soule, Returning Negligence, supra note 14, at 10-11 (quoting KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 24, § 96, at 686-87 (emphasis added)).
76. See Ramstad v. Lear Siegler Diversified Holdings Corp., 836 F. Supp. 1511, 1516
(D. Minn. 1993) (directing verdict on claim of failure to warn of dangers associated
with use of grain auger, finding no causation where the plaintiff was fully aware of the
dangers); Balder v. Haley, 399 N.W.2d 77 (Minn. 1987) (reinstating a directed verdict
upon finding no causation as a matter of law for failure to warn of hazards in repairing
a gas water heater where plaintiff attempted to do so despite several verbal warnings
the day of the accident and despite the obvious smell of gas in the area of the water
heater); Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, 181 N.W.2d 882 (1970)
(upholding a directed verdict for a manufacturer of a prescription drug on claim of
failure to warn where the doctor prescribing the drug was fully aware of the danger
and chose to disregard the manufacturer's recommendations); Hart v. FMC Corp., 446
N.W.2d 194 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (reversing a verdict against the manufacturer of a
tripper car for alleged failure to warn where the danger involved in using the tripper
had been made known to everyone who worked with the product including the
plaintiff); McCormick v. Custom Pools, Inc., 376 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(upholding summary judgment for a claim of failure to warn of the risk of diving in
a shallow pool, upon finding that plaintiff, an experienced swimmer, was fully aware
of the risks).
77. Priefer v. Michelin Tire Corp., No. C2-90-79, 1990 WL 68624, at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. May 29, 1990).
78. 486 N.W.2d 179 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
79. Id. at 181.
80. See also Marko v. Aluminum Co. of Am., No. CX-94-789, 1994 WL 615004
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 1994) (upholding summary judgment in favor of manufactur-
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Finally, while the Minnesota courts have in several cases
considered what evidence may defeat causation in a failure-towarn case, "the courts have not analyzed in significant depth the
other side of the issue, that is, what affirmative evidence must
the plaintiff offer to show that an accident was caused by a
failure to warn."81 The Minnesota Supreme Court briefly
considered the issue in Kalio v. Ford Motor Co.82 Despite weak
evidence of causation, the court sustained a failure-to-warn
verdict. The court resolved the case "[w]ithout deciding
whether a rebuttable presumption exists that a warning would
have been heeded."8 3 A Minnesota federal court has also
determined that Minnesota courts would not adopt such a
presumption.8 4 Thus, the causation element requires some
evidence that the product user would have acted differently if
the manufacturer had provided an adequate warning.8 5
VI. Conclusion
The Restatement (Third) conforms to Minnesota failure-towarn law in many ways. To properly apply the reasonable care
standard, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court must act to
restore the proper roles of court and jury in deciding whether
the manufacturer should have provided a warning. Moreover,
the failure-to-warnjury instruction requires fundamental revision
so that the jury may properly decide failure-to-warn cases under
the reasonable care standard. The Restatement (Third) may
provide the impetus for the Minnesota courts to more fully align
the Minnesota failure-to-warn analysis with traditional negligence
theory.

ers of a tire and its rim as to plaintiffs' claim of failure to warn of the danger of
igniting flammable materials within the tire; finding no causation as a matter of law
where plaintiff had conceded that he did not read the warnings provided to him and
that it was his practice not to read warnings).
81. Soule & Bjork, Minnesota Products, supra note 14, at 19.
82. 407 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1987).
83. Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 99 (1987).
84. Ramstad, 836 F. Supp. at 1516. The Restatement (Third) is silent as to whether
a presumption should exist that a warning, if given, would have been heeded.
85. Krein v. Raudabough, 406 N.W.2d 315, 320 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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